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7 January 1994 - United Express 6291

On January 7, 1994, a Jetstream J4101, N304UE, operated by Atlantic Coast Airlines of Sterling, Virginia, as United Express flight 6291, was on a scheduled commuter flight from Dulles International Airport to Port Columbus International Airport, in Gahanna, Ohio.

At 23.10h Columbus Approach Control was contacted, advising the controller that the flight was descending through 13200ft for 11000ft. The crew were then assigned a 285 degree heading to intercept the ILS for runway 28L and was cleared for 10000ft.

An updated weather report was received five minutes later, reading a measured ceiling 800ft overcast, visibility 2,5mls in light snow and fog with wind 300 deg. at 4kts. A runway 28L ILS approach clearance was given when the flight passed the SUMIE final approach fix. A clearance to land on 28L was given two minutes later.

The aircraft was descending through ca 1250ft msl (runway elevation 814ft msl) when the stick shaker activated and sounded for 3 seconds and continued again after 1,5 sec. The aircraft continued to descend below the glide slope until it collided with a stand of trees in a high nose-up attitude, coming to rest upright in a commercial building, 1,2mls short of the runway. The aircraft burst into flames.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigated the crash and released its report on October 6, 1994. In the report, the crew and Atlantic Coast Airlines were faulted for the crash. The pilots followed a poorly planned and executed approach, then improperly responded to a stall warning, and lacked experience in aircraft equipped with an electronic flight instrument system. Atlantic Coast failed to provide adequate stabilized approach criteria, suitable training simulators, and crew resource management training.

In addition, the report recommended that the type of seatbelts used on the aircraft be removed from service on all airplanes, and that certification of future seatbelt designs include a test matching the conditions that were experienced during this incident

Download the full NTSB report.

Transcript of the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)


Legenda:( ) = Questionable Insertion
(( )) = Editorial Insertion
[ ] = FSF or NTSB clarifications
* Transcript from aircraft's cockpit voice recorder.
Source: U.S. National Transportation Safety Board

Time: Source: Content:
2311:18 Captain (Capt.): You ever get 'em? [Referring to first officer's attempt to reach the company dispatcher by radio.]
2311:19 First officer (FO): No, no.
2311:21 Capt.: Okay, screw 'em.
2311:26 Capt.: Okay, we're going down to 10,000. D and A's been completed, ah ... the only thing we have left is reach company.
2311:45 Capt.: Depending upon what we go through I might have you pop the boots at the outer marker, we'll see.
2311:49 FO: Okay ... all I'd have to do is hit auto-cycle light up bright up here?
2311:55 Capt.: Yeah, just hit auto-cycle.
2311:56 FO: Right, okay.
2312:12 FO: You got six miles in eleven hundred, so typical ....
2312:18 Capt.: Oh yeah, not worried about that.
2312:35 Capt.: Down to four. [Clearance from CMH to descend and maintain 4,000 feet received by FO.]
2312:35 FO: That's what I said to him.
2312:41 Capt.: Yeah, I'm just repeating it, I heard you.
2313:29 Capt.: What's the winds, the surface winds down there... again?
2313:32 FO: Ah, three three zero at four knots.
2313:35 Capt.: Thanks.
2314:12 Capt.: Tell you what.
2314:13 FO: Yeah.
2314:15 Capt.: Bust the boots.
2314:28 FO: You only got a little rime.
2314:44 Capt.: Yeah, I got a little bit.
2314:52 FO: Seems to be a little rime, it never took nothing off [unintelligible] this side here.
2314:56 Capt.: Yeah, it didn't take that much off ... that's cool.
2315:56 Capt.: Hello.
2315:59 FO: So now it's two and a half with 800. [CMH reported the weather at the airport.]
2316:20 Capt.: What's the ice AOA [angle of attack], ah ...
2316:26 Capt.: What's the V speed?
2316:43   [Sound of single chime]
2316:46 Capt.: We're gonna do flaps 25 ice AOA on so what's the ref speed for that ... at this weight?
2317:19 Capt.: Thousand.
2317:20 FO: Ref's gonna be ...
2317:20   [Sound similar to that of altitude or gear warning alert.]
2317:21 FO: One to go ... ref is gonna be one twelve.
2317:25 Capt.: What, that's with the ice AOA, right?
2317:28 FO: That's affirm.
2317:29 Capt.: Okay, that's what we're gonna do ... that's what we're gonna do.
2317:46   [Sound of single chime.]
2317:58   [Sound similar to reduction in prop/engine noise amplitude.]
2318:26 Capt.: Two ninety-one. [Referring to FO's use of 391 rather than 291 to identify the flight during radio communication.]
2318:36 FO: What did I say?
2318:38 Capt.: Three ninety-one.
2318:39 FO: Oh.
2318:40 Capt.: Okay, if you got all the speeds don't worry about them anymore.
2318:44 FO: Ref is 112, I gotta plug that (too).
2318:46 Capt.: I did it for you.
2318:53 FO: Here comes glideslope. ((Sound similar to altitude or gear warning alert.))
2319:30 Capt.: And we're marker inbound.
2319:36.8 Capt.: Don't forget to give me my calls, 1,014 is DH [decision height].
2320:01.3 FO: A thousand above.
2320:02.3 Capt.: Okay, flaps nine.
2320:08.5 Capt.: Gear down.
2320:25.6 FO: Flaps fifteen, landing gear down, three green.
2320:31.6 FO: Condition levers a hund- ... condition levers a hundred percent.
2320:36.1 Capt.: Okay, give me a hundred percent, please.
2320:38.1 FO: A hundred percent, flows at three.
2320.41.1 Capt.: Three.
2320:41.6 FO: Yaw damper.
2320:42.7 Capt.: And autopilot to go, don't touch.
2320:44.5 FO: Don't touch.
2320:46.2 FO: Holding on the yaw damper.
2320:46.6   ((Sound similar to that of a stick shaker start.))
2320:47.2   ((Sound of seven tones similar to that of autopilot disconnect alert.))
2320:48.1 Capt.: Tony.
2320:49.5   ((Sound similar to that of a stick shaker stops.))
2320:50.2 Capt.: What did you do?
2320:50.8 FO: I didn't do nothing.
2320:51   ((Sound similar to that of stick shaker starts.))
2320:52.3   ((Sound similar to that of an increase in prop/engine noise amplitude.))
2320:52.5 Capt.: Gimme flaps up.
2320:53.7   ((Sound similar to that of a stick shaker stops.))
2320:53.7 Capt.: No, no, hold it.
2320:54.0   ((The GPWS transmits ...Pull....))
2320:54.3   ((Sound similar to that of a stick shaker starts again and continues to the end of recording.))
2320:55.3 Capt.: Gimme flaps up.
2320:57.5   ((Sound similar to that of change in or addition to stick shaker.))
2320:58.7 Capt.: Whoa.
2321:00.2   ((Sound of impact.))
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