Skip to main content

5 September 1996 - Fedex 1406

The crew of FedEx 1406, a DC-10 with registration N68055, had checked in early that morning with company operations prior to performing their separate duties. The captain and first officer reviewed the weather, while the flight engineer reported to the airplane to accomplish his preflight.

After his inspection, the flight engineer received a hazardous materials (HAZMAT) briefing by a dangerous goods specialist in Memphis. This briefing included the HAZMAT locations onboard the airplane. On the flight engineer's recommendation, the captain signed the dangerous goods loading manifest prior to departure.

Along with the cargo, two FedEx company employees accompanied the crew on the flight. Both occupied the jumpseats in the foyer area aft of the cockpit door.

FedEx 1406 blocked out six minutes late at 3:42 a.m. The engine start, taxi, takeoff and climb were normal and the first officer leveled the airplane off at flight level 330.

Approximately 200 miles from Boston, the crew saw the master caution lights illuminate. The captain and flight engineer noticed the #7, #8, and #9 Smoke Warning lights on the flight engineer's panel, as well.

"You see that? We got cabin cargo smoke ... cabin cargo smoke," stated the captain. "Cabin cargo smoke, oxygen masks on," replied the flight engineer.

After accomplishing all immediate action memory items for the Fire and Smoke checklist, all three crewmembers donned their oxygen masks and checked in on interphone.

The first officer continued flying the airplane, while the captain coordinated with air traffic control (ATC) and worked with the flight engineer on the checklists. The captain could smell smoke as soon as the warning lights illuminated and noticed a very fine smoke haze in the cockpit during descent. He had been in another airplane fire in the mid-1970s. He remembered that same acrid smell and knew "this was for real."

The captain turned on the seat belt sign in an attempt to get the jumpseat rider's attention, since they were unable to communicate with them on the interphone. "Why don't you have those guys come up here," asked the captain. The flight engineer opened the cockpit door, raised his oxygen mask and told the jumpseat riders to put on their masks. "Both of you come up front," the engineer said. "We're going to descend."

Mr. Frederick Olmsted, one of the jumpseaters, recalled that everyone in the cockpit had their masks on. He soon realized, "This was not routine." Neither jumpseater remembered smelling smoke immediately. They were both reading magazines when the flight engineer alerted them.

While the jumpseat riders donned their oxygen masks, the flight engineer began the Fire and Smoke checklist. The smoke warning now indicated smoke in position #7. "Okay, it's moving forward, whatever it is," the captain said. "It's up to seven." Then he said, "We've definitely got smoke, guys. Let's run (the checklist), let's get this thing depressurized ... let's get it down."

The captain quickly declared an emergency with Boston Center, stating, "We have smoke in the cabin at this time. We're at (flight level) 330. We'd like to proceed direct and we need to descend at this time." Boston immediately cleared the crew to 11,000 feet and informed them of the their airfield options. "Albany (is) in your 11 o'clock (position) and about 50 miles. Stewart is probably the closest airport. It'll be at a 180-degree turn and about 25 miles." The captain chose Stewart.

Olmsted, the jumpseater, recalled there were lots of checklists, lots of conversation and lots of crew coordination. Everything happened very fast, the captain reported. He guessed that the crew began their descent within approximately one minute of the initial smoke warning. The captain did not call for the Emergency Descent checklist, but informally completed the items. The first officer described the descent as a rapid emergency descent, with full speed brakes and maximum speed. The cockpit voice recorder even recorded an overspeed warning. The flight engineer opened the cockpit door several times and saw grayish smoke accumulating in the foyer area. Olmsted could also see wisps of smoke in the dark cockpit.

During descent, the engineer began working the Cabin Cargo Smoke Light Illuminated checklist, but was confused by some of the items. He felt rushed with the workload during the entire descent, attempting to calculate approach data while running the emergency checklists.

After the flight engineer depressurized the airplane, the Smoke Detector lights extinguished. Then reilluminated, followed by two additional lights. These positions indicated smoke getting closer to the cockpit. When the captain asked the flight engineer to test the system, some of the lights did not test properly. The captain felt this meant the conditions were "deteriorating."

In addition to his real inflight fire experience, the captain also experienced a simulated cargo fire during his last crew resource management simulator. The scenario was almost identical to the emergency he was presently battling.

When the captain saw the first officer slowing to 250 knots at 10,000 feet, he yelled, "Keep the speed up man. Don't slow to 250 (knots). We're in an emergency situation here!"

The captain said they began to see the ground approximately twelve miles from Stewart airport. Then he saw the airport's strobe lights at his "ten o'clock" position." Olmsted said the smoke was thick in the cockpit. He could see the captain and first officer from the jump seat, but could not see the instruments on the forward panel.

At the captain's direction, the first officer landed the airplane on runway 27. The captain took control of the airplane on the rollout. He could see the fire trucks waiting and taxied the airplane to the fire fighters, stopping on the taxiway. The flight engineer said when the thrust reversers were deployed after landing, all Smoke Warning lights, Master Warning lights and lower Cargo Fire lights illuminated. He swiftly discharged the fire agent, as per the checklist. Egress After landing, the flight engineer opened the cockpit door and saw that the foyer area was full of smoke. He said cockpit visibility was good, until they opened the cockpit door after landing. Then the smoke poured in and "the visibility went down the toilet." The captain stopped the airplane and both he and the flight engineer called for an emergency evacuation. The captain did not read the Emergency Evacuation checklist, but he pulled all three fire handles and attempted to discharge the fire agents. The first officer shut off the engine start levers as the flight engineer turned off the battery switch. The flight engineer never felt he had time to do the Emergency Evacuation checklist. Olmsted, a 727 crewmember, told investigators that the "thick and choking smoke in the cockpit would have made it difficult to read the evacuation checklist."

The flight engineer went into the foyer area where the visibility was still good enough to see the L1 (left-front) door. He pulled the door emergency control lever on the LI door and heard a hissing noise, but the door did not open. The flight engineer pulled the lever harder, but the door still did not open. The visibility in the foyer was deteriorating, so the flight engineer walked cautiously to the R (right-front) door, which was not visible from the LI door, but was unable to open that door either. The captain estimated the foyer visibility at 3-5 feet.

The captain went back into the cockpit to open his window for egress. He unlatched his window and turned the window crank, feeling resistance. When he broke the air seal, the captain heard air escape with a hissing noise, then the cockpit visibility decreased almost to zero. Realizing the problem, the captain shouted, "We're still pressurized!"

When the flight engineer heard the captain shout, he ran back into the cockpit. Yelling, "Get back on oxygen!" he cranked the outflow valve open, depressurizing the airplane. The captain could not find his oxygen mask, which had dropped down to the floor.
After the flight engineer depressurized the airplane, the captain and first officer finally opened their windows. The captain saw the jumpseat riders wearing the only remaining oxygen masks, so he and the first officer stuck their heads outside to breathe. The captain described the smoke as gray to black, then turning black with a horrible acrid smell. He had to hold his breath until his window was opened. The smoke billowed out the window like a chimney.

After the first officer got his window opened, he saw the R1 slide deployed.

When the engineer heard the first officer say the door was opened, he grabbed his flashlight and entered the foyer area a second time. The visibility in the foyer area was bad with an acrid smelling smoke that did not smell like smoke from an electrical fire. The smoke was oily and sooty.

After shouting, "C'mon, c'mon, the ramps are out!" the flight engineer could hear voices in the foyer asking, "Where are you?" "I'm over here," he answered. "Follow the light." He aimed his flashlight toward the voices. The jumpseat riders came out of the smoke, went down the R1 slide, and the engineer followed them down. The first officer was sitting on the windowsill with his feet on his seat. He remained with the airplane until he was certain the jumpseat riders had evacuated. He had planned on evacuating via the door slides; but when he turned, he could not see the cockpit door. He then decided to evacuate through his cockpit window via the escape ropes and was met on the ground by the flight engineer and the jumpseat riders. According to Olmsted, smoke was now boiling out of the airplane, coming out of every opening.

The captain knelt on his seat with his upper body outside his window. The last time he came back into the cockpit, visibility was zero. He couldn't even see his hand in front of his face. He would also have to exit through the cockpit window.

Holding onto the escape rope, the captain came out of his window headfirst, righted himself, did one or two hand over hands and slid down the rope the rest of the way. He suffered rope burns to his hands during egress. The captain had his injured hands treated by rescue personnel. The flight engineer estimated that the evacuation took approximately 1 1/2 to 2 minutes.

The flight engineer briefed fire fighters on the location of HAZMAT containers and the location and operation of the Halon bottles connected to the HAZMAT containers. Fire fighters entered the airplane and manually opened the main cargo door to fight the fire.

Olmsted said the flame came out of the roof in front of the number 2 engine with black smoke and reddish-orange flame, like a blowtorch. When the flames vented through the cabin roof, the fire fighters got into their trucks and spayed the fire with foam. The fire eventually destroyed the airplane.

Investigators estimated the replacement cost of the airplane at $95 million and the lost cargo at $300 million. The National Transportation Safety Board never determined the source of the fire.

Download the full report

Transcript of the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)

Legenda RDO = Radio transmission from accident aircraft
INT = Intercom
CAM = Cockpit Area Microphone sound or source
-1 = Voice identified as Captain
-2 = Voice identified as First Officer
-3 = Voice identified as Second Officer
BCNTR = Boston air route traffic control center (ARTCC)
* = Unintelligible word
# = Expletive deleted
() = Questionable text
(()) = Editorial insertion
- = Pause

Notes: All times are expressed in eastern daylight savings time. Only radio transmissions involving the accident aircraft were transcribed.

0536: 00 CAM [start of transcript]
0536: 00 CAM-1 oh you were back there when we discussed all this, I forgot.
0536: 04 CAM-1 this thing's on a .. this thing is on a check status.
0536: 07 CAM-2 is it?
0536: 07 CAM-1 it's just the fact that they got the paperwork all screwed up.
0536: 10 CAM-2 we'll couple it up?
0536: 12 CAM-1 you just want to go ahead and couple it yourself and just go ahead and make the landing?
0536: 15 CAM-2 yeah, do they want an autoland though?
0536: 17 CAM-1 yeah.
0536: 18 CAM-2 they do want an autoland?
0536: 18 CAM-1 yeah.
0536: 19 CAM-2 * * *.
0536: 20 CAM-1 just follow through on it? .. it's visual, I don't give a #.
0536: 23 CAM-1 what the hell's that?
0536: 25 CAM-2,3 cabin cargo smoke.
0536: 27 CAM-1 you see that .. we got cabin cargo smoke ... cabin cargo smoke.
0536: 31 CAM-3 cabin cargo smoke, oxygen masks on.
0536: 36 CAM-3 slash courier communication established.
0536: 38 CAM-1 alright we got it.
0536: 40 CAM-3 okay it's number nine smoke detector.
0536: 40 BCNTR fedex fourteen zero six turn twenty degrees left vectors behind company for boston.
0536: 44 CAM-3 let the courier know.
0536: 46 RDO-1 understand twenty left for fourteen zero six?
0536: 49 BCNTR that's correct .. I have company traffic about twenty-five north of ya at thirty-three also going into boston .. he's an airbus.
0536: 56 RDO-1 roger.
0536: 59 BCNTR I didn't figure I'd have to vector this early in the morning.
0537: 03 CAM-2 why don't you have those guys come up here.
0537: 08 INT-1 there you go .. everybody checked in.
0537: 09 INT-2 okay why don't you have those -
0537: 11 INT-3 okay second officer up.
0537: 18 INT-2 why don't you have those guys come up here.
0537: 22 INT-1 okay we're getting two of them now.
0537: 26 INT-1 let's get on it .. on the red tabs there and ah -
0537: 29 INT-2 why don't you have those guys come up here?
0537: 31 INT-1 let's open the door and see what it looks like.
0537: 42 CAM-3 why don't you guys come up.
0537: 48 INT-1 let's find out what we've got going here.
0537: 56 INT-1 okay it's moving forward whatever it is .. it's up to seven.
0538: 06 INT-3 okay fire and smoke .. oxygen mask and smoke goggles as required on one hundred percent .. crew and courier communication established .. that completes the phase ones.
0538: 14 INT-1 roger.
0538: 17 INT-3 cockpit door and smoke screen closed.
0538: 27 INT-3 it's closed ... if descent is required proceed to step six ... if descent not required proceed to step fourteen.
0538: 38 INT-1 have you run a a-
0538: 40 INT-3 pull cabin air.
0538: 42 INT-3 type of smoke or fire on step fourteen .. descent not required.
0538: 48 INT-3 cabin cargo smoke.
0538: 55 INT-3 can best be recognized by checking smoke detectors second officer's panel by observing smoke or fire in the main deck cargo area .. that completes ah fire and smoke going to cabin cargo smoke.
0539: 07 INT-1 what we've got is cabin cargo, correct?
0539: 11 INT-3 that's affirmative.
0539: 13 INT-1 alright ... have you run the test on it yet?
0539: 18 INT-3 doing that now.
0539: 28 INT-1 that's seven and eight.
0539: 31 INT-3 those others may be failing in the blinking mode.
0539: 37 INT-1 the blinking mode is a normal test is it not?
0539: 41 INT-3 pardon me?
0539: 43 INT-1 they should come on blinking on the test, isn't that correct?
0539: 45 INT-3 no they should come on steady on the test.
0539: 47 INT-1 okay.
0539: 47 INT-3 everything should come on steady.
0539: 49 INT-1 okay.
0539: 50 INT-3 okay ready to run the cabin cargo smoke light -
0539: 52 INT-1 I got ten now.
0539: 55 INT-3 ready to run the cabin cargo smoke light illuminated.
0539: 57 INT-1 go ahead.
0540: 01 INT-3 okay it says pack function selectors two off .. two are off.
0540: 07 INT-1 we've definitely got smoke guys .. we need to get down right now let's go.
0540: 18 RDO-1 okay what's the closest field I wonder .. here let me talk to them here.
0540: 22 RDO-1 center fedex fourteen zero six.
0540: 24 BCNTR - saying something about the closest field I'll get back to that in a second but one hundred heading seven thousand expect straight in runway six.
0540: 30 RDO-1 let's run it, let's get this thing depressurized .. let's get it down.
0540: 34 RDO-1 center fedex fourteen zero six.
0540: 38 RDO-1 center fedex fourteen zero six.
0540: 40 BCNTR fedex fourteen zero six go ahead .. you have a problem?
0540: 43 RDO-1 yes sir we do .. we have smoke in the cabin at this time .. we're at three three zero .. we'd like to proceed direct and we need to descend at this time.
0540: 53 BCNTR fedex fourteen zero six roger descend and maintain one one thousand .. stewart altimeter three zero one five and if you want to go to albany it's in your eleven o'clock and about fifty miles .. stewart is probably the closest airport it'll be at ah hundred and eighty degree turn and about twenty- five miles.
0541: 11 RDO-1 okay stewart field ah and a right turn to ah a hundred and eighty degrees now?
0541: 17 BCNTR you'd make a left hand turn to a heading of two four zero and it is uhm let's see now twenty-five miles .. left turn heading two four zero.
0541: 27 RDO-1 left turn two four zero .. say the weather at stewart.
0541: 32 CAM-1 (go ahead turn).
0541: 35 INT-3 okay ready to run when you are.
0541: 38 INT-1 okay run the checklist.
0541: 41 INT-3 okay courier mask and goggles verify on one hundred percent .. cockpit air outlets open ... they are open ... it says ah land as soon as possible ... and we are descending now ... if unable to extinguish fire and smoke manually raise cabin altitude to twenty-five thousand .. while you're in a descent to eleven?
0542: 03 INT-1 roger, go ahead and start raising it.
0542: 07 INT-3 okay continue the descent.
0542: 21 INT-3 and we now have just detectors eight, nine and ten .. we've lost detector seven .. it's gone out.
0542: 28 INT-1 roger.
0542: 30 INT-3 okay what's that ah .. stand by.
0542: 36 BCNTR fedex fourteen zero six I've got albany if you want to go up to stewart you can do that .. I've got albany in your eleven o'clock and about forty-five miles or stewart in your southwesterly position and ah forty miles .. your choice.
0542: 49 RDO-1 okay we need to get it on the ground .. we need to get to stewart .. give us vectors.
0542: 53 BCNTR okay fedex fourteen zero six roger turn left heading two four zero .. you can remain in a left hand turn and stewart's wide open for ya.
0543: 00 RDO-1 roger.
0543: 02 INT-3 and I'm manually raising the cabin altitude .. there is smoke in the ah cabin area.
0543: 03 CAM [sound of overspeed warning alert]
0543: 06 INT-1 roger.
0543: 12 INT-2 okay .. okay you have an approach plate for us?
0543: 25 CAM-? *.
0543: 22 INT-3 what's the three letter identifier for stewart.
0543: 30 RDO-1 give me a plate for -
0543: 38 BCNTR fedex calling boston say again please.
0543: 43 RDO-1 center .. stewart field .. what's that listed under?
0543: 47 BCNTR sierra whiskey foxtrot newburgh new york.
0543: 49 CAM-? newburgh new york.
0543: 51 RDO-1 okay.
0544: 04 BCNTR fedex fourteen zero six if you could when you get a chance the uhm fuel on board and souls please.
0544: 12 INT-3 thirty-three thousand pounds.
0544: 14 RDO-1 thirty-three thousand pounds .. five souls on board.
0544: 18 BCNTR could you say that one more time please?
0544: 19 RDO-1 thirty-three thousand pounds .. five souls on board.
0544: 19 CAM [sound of overspeed warning alert]
0544: 22 BCNTR thirty-three thousand five souls .. thank you.
0544: 25 INT-3 and ah current altimeter.
0544: 27 RDO-1 current altimeter setting please?
0544: 28 BCNTR stewart altimeter three zero one five, sir.
0544: 32 RDO-1 three zero one five.
0544: 34 INT-3 three zero one five set in the back.
0544: 44 BCNTR fourteen zero six descend and maintain four thousand .. you can proceed direct to kingston VOR .. that's india golf november .. that's for the VOR runway two seven at stewart.
0544: 55 RDO-1 okay what's that frequency?
0544: 57 BCNTR stand by one second ..... frequency's one one seven point six, sir.
0545: 15 INT-3 and it looks like we just have smoke detector ten lit now.
0545: 19 RDO-1 okay, sir, we don't have the VOR approach to two seven on file here on the airplane.
0545: 34 BCNTR fedex fourteen zero six roger .. would you like a visual to the airport?
0545: 36 RDO-1 roger, get us down to the airport and we'll take the visual ... the only thing we have on board is for the ILS to nine.
0545: 44 BCNTR alright ILS to nine is the only thing you can handle okay .. it's a two one zero heading now for the airport and it's twenty-eight point two miles from your present position and you can expect a visual.
0545: 55 RDO-1 roger two one zero.
0545: 57 INT-3 okay what is the three letter identifier for -
0545: 58 BCNTR and fedex fourteen zero six maintain four thousand.
0546: 08 RDO-1 it's cleared to four thousand now for fedex fourteen zero six?
0546: 10 BCNTR fedex fourteen zero six affirmative maintain four thousand.
0546: 14 INT-3 three letter identifier again for that airport?
0546: 19 RDO-1 ah stewart?
0546: 21 INT-3 yeah.
0546: 21 RDO-1 S-T-W.
0546: 26 BCNTR sierra whiskey foxtrot is stewart.
0546: 31 INT-3 okay we are depressurized.
0546: 34 INT-1 alright.
0546: 41 RDO-1 and center, I don't know if I did it before but fourteen zero six is declaring an emergency and we do need equipment standing by.
0546: 44 BCNTR fourteen zero six, that's already been taken care of .. the equipment will be standing by.
0546: 51 RDO-1 roger.
0546: 52 INT-3 okay, it says fire .. check extin guished .. the lights are off .. it's still smoky out there.
0546: 56 BCNTR fourteen zero six fly your present heading ... expect a visual approach to the stewart airport from new york approach control .. contact new york approach one three two point seven five.
0547: 05 RDO-1 three two seven five, roger.
0547: 08 INT-3 caution .. no crewmember should leave the cockpit to fight a fire ... we're not gonna do that.
0547: 14 RDO-1 approach, fedex fourteen zero six.
0547: 17 NYAPP fedex fourteen zero six new york approach .. stewart altimeter is three zero one eight .. descend and maintain four thousand ... did you figure out what approach you need yet?
0547: 24 RDO-1 three zero one eight down to four thousand.
0547: 27 RDO-1 keep the speed up man, don't slow to two fifty .. we're in an emergency situation here.
0547: 31 NYAPP american fourteen zero six speed's your discretion .. speed's not a problem .. I just need to know what approach you want?
0547: 36 RDO-1 roger we do not have a two seven approach plate .. all we have is runway nine .. if we can get it we'd like to get in there visually if you can line us up.
0547: 43 NYAPP roger fourteen zero six .. do you want me to run line up for runway niner or runway two seven?
0547: 47 RDO-1 two seven.
0547: 49 NYAPP american fourteen zero six roger .. fly heading two one zero .. correction fly heading one niner zero.
0547: 54 RDO-1 one nine zero.
0548: 07 INT-3 I need the three letter identifier for that airport so I can call it up.
0548: 11 RDO-? S-W-F.
0548: 13 NYAPP american fourteen zero six be advised stewart weather as of zero nine four five zulu winds are calm .. three miles visibility .. fog and a broken layer at seven thousand feet .. stewart altimeter's three zero one eight.
0548: 26 RDO-1 three zero one eight, roger.
0548: 27 CAM-2 slats extend.
0548: 29 INT-3 okay, land at nearest suitable airport .. cabin cargo smoke light illuminated checklist complete.
0548: 36 RDO-1 okay, they're out, aren't they?
0548: 38 CAM [sound of overspeed warning alert]
0548: 38 RDO-1 get rid of it .. but we still need to get this thing on the ground.
0548: 41 CAM-2 what's the field elevation?
0548: 41 NYAPP american fourteen zero six roger .. the VOR runway two seven approach course goes off the kingston two four four radial if you want to tune that in.
0548: 50 CAM [sound of altitude alert and overspeed warnings]
0548: 54 RDO-1 roger, two forty- four degree radial.
0548: 59 NYAPP american fourteen zero six descend and maintain three thousand.
0549: 02 RDO-1 three thousand, fourteen zero six.
0549: 08 RDO-1 boy this sucks doesn't it.
0549: 09 CAM [interrupt in CVR audio from tape splice]
0549: 09 INT-3 is there a three letter identifier -
0549: 10 CAM-2 is there a VOR or something on the field?
0549: 13 RDO-1 yeah, two forty- four here .. intercept that ... that's off the kingston VOR .. going into the runway.
0549: 17 NYAPP fedex fourteen zero six that's affirmative .. on your present .. turn ten degrees right to intercept the kingston two four four radial.
0549: 23 RDO-1 intercept the two four four radial .. ten degrees right.
0549: 25 CAM [sound of altitude alert warning]
0549: 28 INT-3 I can't give you any take- off or landing data.
0549: 32 INT-1 you can't?
0549: 33 INT-3 I can't find the airport in my directory.
0549: 37 RDO-1 just get a weight and use your table tops.
0549: 43 RDO-1 get rid of the boards.
0549: 48 RDO-1 three hundred and thirty thousand pounds.
0549: 53 RDO-1 V ref is one thirty- one for flaps fifty ... one thirty- six for thirty- five.
0550: 03 NYAPP fedex fourteen zero six turn right heading two two zero to intercept the kingston two four four radial .. descend and maintain two thousand five hundred.
0550: 11 RDO-1 two thousand five hundred and two two zero on the heading.
0550: 13 CAM [sound of altitude alert warning]
0550: 20 INT-3 in range .. airspeed bugs.
0550: 22 RDO-1 okay we're working on it ... two seventeen's your top bug.
0550: 30 RDO-1 one eighty- seven's the next one .. one fifty- five .. the next one -
0550: 41 NYAPP fedex fourteen zero six when you get a second the fire department needs to know if there's any hazardous material on the plane.
0550: 48 INT-1 (Larry)?
0550: 49 INT-3 yes.
0550: 50 RDO-1 yes there is, sir.
0550: 53 INT-1 okay, it's coming alive.
0550: 59 RDO-1 go to twenty- five hundred feet.
0551: 04 INT-3 and I've got additional smoke detectors on now.
0551: 06 NYAPP fedex fourteen zero six the lights are all the way up .. you can expect to stay on this frequency .. you will not have another frequency change .. you'll be cleared to land from this ah on this frequency .. the airport is at twelve o'clock and ten miles .. report in sight.
0551: 16 RDO-1 fourteen zero six wilco.
0551: 21 RDO-1 okay, what's your double bug?
0551: 23 NYAPP fedex fourteen zero six descend and maintain two thousand three hundred.
0551: 26 RDO-1 twenty- three hundred, roger.
0551: 27 CAM-2 flaps fifteen.
0551: 28 RDO-1 twenty- three hundred.
0551: 30 RDO-1 what's the double bug in there on the table top .. for ah three hundred thirty thousand?
0551: 32 CAM [sound of altitude alert warning]
0551: 36 INT-3 ah three thirty .. stand by.
0551: 41 NYAPP fedex fourteen zero six .. this is not a standard approach .. this is an angled approach to the runway.
0551: 42 INT-3 two fifty- eight is optimum.
0549: 32 RDO-1 roger.
0551: 50 INT-1 what'd you get for a double bug?
0551: 52 CAM-2 hey bruce, I don't have the plate .. you're gonna have to talk me in to this.
0551: 56 RDO-1 I am talkin' you into it .. we don't have the plate for this either .. we're doing a visual.
0551: 59 INT-3 okay for thirty- five ah .... thirty- five extend that's all I've got.
0552: 06 CAM-2 flaps twenty- two.
0552: 08 NYAPP fedex fourteen zero six descend and maintain two thousand.
0552: 10 RDO-1 two thousand fedex fourteen zero six.
0552: 12 INT-3 V ref thirty- five extend is one thirty- six.
0552: 13 CAM [sound of altitude warning alert]
0552: 15 NYAPP fedex fourteen zero six field is twelve o'clock and seven and a half miles.
0552: 17 RDO-1 roger.
0552: 21 INT-3 one thirty- six for V ref flap .. thirty- five extend.
0552: 26 CAM-2 gear down .... before landing checklist.
0552: 32 RDO-1 I think I'm starting to see the runway out there at twelve o'clock.
0552: 38 RDO-1 it comes in at an angle.
0552: 42 NYAPP fedex fourteen zero six field is now twelve o'clock and five miles .. do you need lower?
0552: 48 RDO-1 yeah affirmative .. have they got the lights all the way up .. we don't see the runway.
0552: 52 NYAPP fedex fourteen zero six that's affirmative .. the lights are all the way up.
0552: 57 INT-3 landing gear?
0552: 59 INT-1 down and three green.
0553: 00 NYAPP fedex fourteen zero six descend and maintain one thousand two hundred.
0553: 01 INT-3 twelve o'clock.
0553: 02 RDO-1 that's not it.
0553: 06 INT-3 thrust computer.
0553: 08 RDO-1 fourteen zero six ... fourteen zero six doesn't have the field here, sir ... we've ah we're visual conditions sir .. we do not see the runway.
0553: 15 NYAPP fedex fourteen zero six say again.
0553: 17 RDO-1 yes sir, we do not see the runway ah at stewart ... now we have it in sight.
0553: 21 INT-3 over here at the left.
0553: 23 NYAPP fedex fourteen zero six you said you have the field?
0553: 26 RDO-1 yes sir, I do believe we have the field at this time.
0553: 28 NYAPP fedex fourteen zero six you're cleared to land runway two seven.
0553: 31 CAM-2 flaps thirty- five .. go right to fifty.
0553: 33 RDO-1 that's not the right runway I don't think, is it? .. yeah it is.
0553: 37 INT-3 thrust computer.
0553: 38 RDO-1 okay that's the runway right there.
0553: 42 CAM [GPWS one thousand foot call]
0553: 42 INT-3 thrust computer .. antiskid .. spoiler.
0553: 45 RDO-1 test and armed.
0553: 49 RDO-1 want some flaps fifty.
0553: 55 INT-1 want the autothrottles?
0554: 01 INT-3 flaps and slats?
0554: 02 RDO-1 okay I've got fifty land.
0554: 05 INT-3 before landing checklist complete.
0554: 06 CAM [GPWS five hundred foot call]
0554: 08 CAM [two GPWS sink rate warnings]
0554: 11 RDO-1 pull it on up.
0554: 16 RDO-1 everything's done.
0554: 20 CAM [GPWS one hundred foot call]
0554: 21 CAM [GPWS sink rate warning]
0554: 23 CAM [GPWS fifty, forty, thirty, twenty and ten foot calls]
0554: 28 CAM [sound similar to that of touchdown]
0554: 29 CAM [sound similar to that of auto- spoiler deployment]
0554: 37 CAM [sound similar to that of reverse thrust]
0554: 44 CAM [sound similar to that of engine spooling down]
0554: 46 INT-1 okay, I've got it ... nice job.
0554: 56 NYAPP fedex fourteen zero six when able you can go over to tower frequency twenty- one eight.
0555: 01 RDO-2 twenty- one what?
0555: 02 NYAPP one two one point eight.
0555: 03 INT-3 okay on the lights we've got a .. (forward fire .. I'm deploying aft).
0555: 07 RDO-1 we need to get the hell out of here.
0555: 10 CAM [sound of engine fire warning alarm starts]
0555: 12 INT-3 agent arm cylinder one switch.
0555: 19 INT-3 emergency ground egress.
0555: 23 CAM [sound of engine fire warning alarm stops]
0555: 24 RDO-1 blow blow the door.
0555: 27   end of recording.
Back to top