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17 March 2000 - BP Amoco Corporation

Prior to departure, the flight crew confirmed that the 'windy, rainy and stormy' weather would move out of New York and proceed northeast up into the Hyannis area. Arriving in the Hyannis Airport area, at night, the crew received the ATIS, which stated that winds were from 040 degrees at 20 knots, gusts to 33 knots. The ILS Runway 15 approach was in use. Braking action was reported poor by a Cessna 402, and all surfaces were covered with a patchy thin layer of snow and ice. The PIC determined that the tailwind component for the ILS Runway 15 approach would have exceeded the airplane's limitations, and requested the ILS Runway 24 approach. The airplane touched down about 2,640 feet beyond the approach end of the 5,425- foot long runway. The airplane impacted the localizer antenna, departed the end of the runway, went through a chain link fence, crossed a two-lane road, struck three vehicles on the road, continued into a parking lot, and impacted concrete barriers and two parked vehicles. Examination of the airplane revealed a takeoff and landing card (TOLD) on the instrument panel. Written on the card was the landing distance calculated as 3,050 feet and a notation of 'BA POOR'. At the time of the accident the runway was covered with a 1/2-inch accumulation of ice and snow. According to the Dassault DA-900 Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Limitations Section, the maximum allowable tailwind component at landing was 10 knots. According to the DA-900 Performance Manual, the maximum safe crosswind on icy runways was 5 knots. The manual also stated, 'For icy runway conditions, landing distance is 3 times the landing distance on dry runway.' Using the factor of 3 and a 10 knot tailwind, a landing distance was computed to be about 10,800 feet. No factors were published for a 20 knot tailwind.


On March 17, 2000, about 1802 Eastern Standard Time, a Dassault DA-900, N814M, operated by BP Amoco Corporation, was substantially damaged when it overran the runway while landing at Barnstable Municipal-Boardman/Polando Field (HYA), Hyannis, Massachusetts. The two certificated airline transport pilots and two passengers were not injured. Two occupants of vehicles on a public road received minor injures. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the executive/corporate flight that originated from the La Guardia Airport (LGA), Flushing, New York. The flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. According to the pilot-in-command (PIC), the VOR Runway 6 approach to HYA had been briefed prior to departing LGA. Arriving in the Hyannis area, the crew received the ATIS "Mike", issued at 1650, which stated that winds were from 040 degrees true at 20 knots, gusts to 33 knots, 1/2 statute mile visibility, snow and freezing fog. Cloud conditions were 900 feet broken, 1,400 feet broken, and 2,000 feet overcast. The ILS Runway 15 approach was in use. The crew determined that the visibility for the VOR Runway 6 approach was below minimums, and the PIC determined that the tailwind component for the ILS Runway 15 approach would have exceeded the airplane's limitations. The PIC requested the ILS Runway 24 approach, and the airplane was then vectored to, and cleared for that approach. During an interview, the PIC stated that he made the decision during the approach that he would land the airplane if the braking action was reported as fair, and discontinue the approach if it was reported as poor. The PIC further stated that the airplane was configured to land, and that he flew the glideslope to the runway. After touchdown, he applied maximum reverse thrust and braking, and called for the "air brakes." As the airplane continued down the runway, he noticed an acceleration, and a lack of braking effectiveness. However, he decided not to attempt a go-around, but opted to "rid[e] it out to the end." A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, who arrived at the airport shortly after the accident, stated that the airplane departed the end of the runway, slid through the Runway 24 localizer antenna array and a chain link fence. With a 200-foot section of the chain link fence attached to the number two engine pylon, the airplane crossed a two-lane road and struck three vehicles that were traveling on the road. The airplane continued into a parking lot, and impacted four concrete parking barriers. It then impacted three cement parking lot light fixture bases and two parked vehicles, before coming to a stop. During the overrun, the airplane's left and right wing fuel tanks ruptured. The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection estimated that approximately 1,200 gallons of Jet-A fuel spilled from the airplane after it came to a stop. A witness, who was standing outside of the airport operations building, stated that he had an unobstructed view of Runway 24 when he observed the accident airplane approach the runway. The witness estimated that the airplane touched down at a point 2,500 beyond the approach end. The airplane continued another 1,500 feet until the thrust reverser was deployed. As the airplane passed the operations building, the speed was excessive for the remaining runway.

The witness then realized that the airplane was not going to stop on the airport property and proceeded to a rescue vehicle. The FAA inspector and a representative from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission examined Runway 24 after the accident. They observed one set of tire tracks in the snow on the runway that correlated to the ground track of the accident airplane. The tire tracks began about 2,640 feet from the approach end of the runway, which was about 2,785 feet from the departure end. According to the passenger seated in the main cabin of the airplane, he could see snow outside the window and it was extremely windy, as the airplane passed though 3,000 feet in it's decent to HYA. As the airplane passed through 1,500 feet, he could see the ground continuously and the airplane was "fighting" to stay level. The airplane was at a very steep angle of decent until touchdown. As the airplane was landing, he could see snow covering the runway and the airplane was not decelerating. The passenger did not recall where the airplane touched down on the runway, or if he had heard the thrust reversers or seen the wing spoilers. The passenger did recall that there was a heavy exhaust noise after the landing. A pilot, who was flying a Piper PA-31 the night of the accident, stated that he had flown from HYA about 1715, and returned to the airport area around 1745. He recalled that the weather conditions were, winds from 070 degrees at 28 knots and gusting. The visibility was about 2 1/2 miles, with an indefinite ceiling. The decision was made to land on Runway 6. After landing, the airplane was turned off of the runway at taxiway Bravo due to the high winds slowing the airplane down after landing. The pilot did not recall if he made a braking action report to the tower, but estimated the conditions as poor, due to the depth of snow and ice on the runway.

Transcript of the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)

CAM - Cockpit area microphone
RDO - Radio transmission from accident aircraft
-1 - Voice identified as Captain
-2 - Voice identified as First Officer
APP - Hyannis-Barnstable Approach
TWR - Hyannis-Barnstable Tower


17.49:36 CAM-1 I don't know if you get time to check with the tower to see what the winds are right now. I wouldn't want to get a surprise after we set up on the...
17.49:43 CAM-2 Okay.
17.49:45 CAM-1 ...on the approach you know and have the winds right down the.
17.50:01 RDO-2 yes sir we-re gonna be with you in just a second. Could you give me your current winds please.
17.50:11 TWR wind ah zero one zero at ah two five.
17.50:16 RDO-2 zero one zero at two five. How's that runway now?
17.50:22 TWR ah no one's ah landed ah. the last braking action report I received was at ah two zero four one * zulu ah braking action was reported poor by a Cessna four oh two. It's ah looks like it appear to be a little more snow on the runway now.
17.50:43 CAM-2 all right he said ah the winds are zero one zero at twenty five now. braking action was ah.
17.50:50 CAM-1 that's not gonna work. that's a big tailwind on landing.
17.50:54 CAM-1 two four would almost work better wouldn't it?
17.51:11 CAM-1 we're gonna have to go around to two four@. I mean I-I that's less tailwind component on two four then would you agree?
17.51:18 CAM-2 yeah # you know. one five. you're gonna just...
17.51:22 CAM-1 okay which*...
17.51:23 CAM-2 ...go over the airport? but see that's you*.
17.51:25 CAM-1 ...yeah why don't you go ahead and ask ah approach to set us up with that please.
17.51:29 CAM-2 two four? okay.
17.51:31 CAM-1 I don't see how we can do it w-with that much tailwind on landing.
  CAM-2 okay.
17.51:38 RDO-2 yes sir I wonder if you'd set us up with the ILS to runway two four ah it looks like the winds ah not in our favor on runway one five.
17.51:46 APP eight one four Mike roger turn right zero niner zero vectors ILS two four final approach course.
17.51:54 CAM-2 I'll get you set up in one second.
  CAM-1 Okay.
17.52:02 CAM-1 that sound like the right thing to do to you.
17.52:04 CAM-2 yeah * your right it's you know I was hoping for a little better but i guess it's not going to work is it.
17.52:12 CAM-2 I'm gonna get back with it in just a second. I'm gonna get the ah.
  CAM-1 okay.
17.52:33 CAM-1 I'd say that's a little less than ten knots of ah tailwind on on landing.
17.54:22 CAM-2 standby one second I'm gonna get you some.
17.54:31 RDO-2 okay we didn't like the winds. we're gonna switch around to the ILS to runway two four. What have you got for braking action and winds now?
17.54:40 TWR the wind ah zero two zero at two six gusts to three four...ah no braking action reports ah received for runway ah two four.
17.54:57 CAM-2 okay he's got zero two zero. # that's gonna be a direct tailwind right there on runway.
17.55:02 CAM-1 what what'd he call it now?
17.55:04 CAM-2 he's calling it zero two zero.
  CAM-1 Okaay.
17.55:08 CAM-2 see that's gonna be a direct tailwind.
17.55:09 CAM-1 we're lan-landing on runway two four right?
17.55:11 CAM-2 yeah but see that's that's not good right? cause this is gonna be more of a tailwind there.
17.55:18 RDO-2 and for eight one four Mike. Say again the ah the wind.
17.55:24 TWR wind zero two zero at two six gusts to three four.
17.55:29 CAM-2 zero two zero at two six and see that's more of a tailwind.
17.55:32 CAM-1 I don't know@. it looks like it's if you look at one five it...
17.55:36 CAM-2 zero two zero.
17.55:37 CAM-1 ...I understand. zero t-. it's almost a-a direct tailwind. I got twenty five hundred for fifteen hundred.
  CAM-2 okay.
17.55:49 CAM-1 slow it up here. do you wanna try to figure the component real quick?
17.55:54 CAM-2 #. I don't even know where the box is.
17.56:09 CAM-1 just look at the compass rose there. it's not a direct tailwind.
17.56:12 CAM-2 yeah but. okay well. zero well that's got a component there.
17.56:19 CAM-1 it's got I know it's got a tailwind component.
17.56:22 CAM-2 okay one five.
17.56:23 CAM-1 ...but I'm guessing it's less than ten.
17.57:22 CAM-2 ah two six one well. yeah you got ninety degrees little bit more***.
17.57:44 CAM-2 all right @ I think you're right.
17.57:45 CAM-1 then okay arm the approach for me.
17.58:37 TWR Falcon eight one four Mike Hyannis tower. runway two four clear to land. ah last braking action report received was by a vehicle ah braking action was reported fair.
17.58:46 CAM-2 eight one four Mike and your wind right now please.
17.58:52 TWR wind ah zero one zero at two two.
17.58:56 CAM-2 zero one zero at two two. eight one four Mike.
17.58:57 CAM-1 that's got to be less than ten knots. okay.
17.58:58 CAM-2 all right I'll buy that.
18.00:01 CAM-2 I got a ground speed of about hundred and fifty nine...
18.00:04 CAM-1 okay thank you.
18.00:44 CAM-2 okay ground speed's one sixty.
18.00:48 CAM-1 okay.
18.01:14 CAM-2 I don't like it.
18.01:18 CAM [Sound similar to touchdown, followed by the captain calling for the "auto-brakes."]
18.01:32 CAM [Sound similar to several impacts.]


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