5 September 1996 - Fedex 1406

The crew of FedEx 1406, a DC-10 with registration N68055, had checked in early that morning with company operations prior to performing their separate duties. The captain and first officer reviewed the weather, while the flight engineer reported to the airplane to accomplish his preflight.

After his inspection, the flight engineer received a hazardous materials (HAZMAT) briefing by a dangerous goods specialist in Memphis. This briefing included the HAZMAT locations onboard the airplane. On the flight engineer's recommendation, the captain signed the dangerous goods loading manifest prior to departure.

Along with the cargo, two FedEx company employees accompanied the crew on the flight. Both occupied the jumpseats in the foyer area aft of the cockpit door.

FedEx 1406 blocked out six minutes late at 3:42 a.m. The engine start, taxi, takeoff and climb were normal and the first officer leveled the airplane off at flight level 330.

Approximately 200 miles from Boston, the crew saw the master caution lights illuminate. The captain and flight engineer noticed the #7, #8, and #9 Smoke Warning lights on the flight engineer's panel, as well.

"You see that? We got cabin cargo smoke ... cabin cargo smoke," stated the captain. "Cabin cargo smoke, oxygen masks on," replied the flight engineer.

After accomplishing all immediate action memory items for the Fire and Smoke checklist, all three crewmembers donned their oxygen masks and checked in on interphone.

The first officer continued flying the airplane, while the captain coordinated with air traffic control (ATC) and worked with the flight engineer on the checklists. The captain could smell smoke as soon as the warning lights illuminated and noticed a very fine smoke haze in the cockpit during descent. He had been in another airplane fire in the mid-1970s. He remembered that same acrid smell and knew "this was for real."

The captain turned on the seat belt sign in an attempt to get the jumpseat rider's attention, since they were unable to communicate with them on the interphone. "Why don't you have those guys come up here," asked the captain. The flight engineer opened the cockpit door, raised his oxygen mask and told the jumpseat riders to put on their masks. "Both of you come up front," the engineer said. "We're going to descend."

Mr. Frederick Olmsted, one of the jumpseaters, recalled that everyone in the cockpit had their masks on. He soon realized, "This was not routine." Neither jumpseater remembered smelling smoke immediately. They were both reading magazines when the flight engineer alerted them.

While the jumpseat riders donned their oxygen masks, the flight engineer began the Fire and Smoke checklist. The smoke warning now indicated smoke in position #7. "Okay, it's moving forward, whatever it is," the captain said. "It's up to seven." Then he said, "We've definitely got smoke, guys. Let's run (the checklist), let's get this thing depressurized ... let's get it down."

The captain quickly declared an emergency with Boston Center, stating, "We have smoke in the cabin at this time. We're at (flight level) 330. We'd like to proceed direct and we need to descend at this time." Boston immediately cleared the crew to 11,000 feet and informed them of the their airfield options. "Albany (is) in your 11 o'clock (position) and about 50 miles. Stewart is probably the closest airport. It'll be at a 180-degree turn and about 25 miles." The captain chose Stewart.

Olmsted, the jumpseater, recalled there were lots of checklists, lots of conversation and lots of crew coordination. Everything happened very fast, the captain reported. He guessed that the crew began their descent within approximately one minute of the initial smoke warning. The captain did not call for the Emergency Descent checklist, but informally completed the items. The first officer described the descent as a rapid emergency descent, with full speed brakes and maximum speed. The cockpit voice recorder even recorded an overspeed warning. The flight engineer opened the cockpit door several times and saw grayish smoke accumulating in the foyer area. Olmsted could also see wisps of smoke in the dark cockpit.

During descent, the engineer began working the Cabin Cargo Smoke Light Illuminated checklist, but was confused by some of the items. He felt rushed with the workload during the entire descent, attempting to calculate approach data while running the emergency checklists.

After the flight engineer depressurized the airplane, the Smoke Detector lights extinguished. Then reilluminated, followed by two additional lights. These positions indicated smoke getting closer to the cockpit. When the captain asked the flight engineer to test the system, some of the lights did not test properly. The captain felt this meant the conditions were "deteriorating."

In addition to his real inflight fire experience, the captain also experienced a simulated cargo fire during his last crew resource management simulator. The scenario was almost identical to the emergency he was presently battling.

When the captain saw the first officer slowing to 250 knots at 10,000 feet, he yelled, "Keep the speed up man. Don't slow to 250 (knots). We're in an emergency situation here!"

The captain said they began to see the ground approximately twelve miles from Stewart airport. Then he saw the airport's strobe lights at his "ten o'clock" position." Olmsted said the smoke was thick in the cockpit. He could see the captain and first officer from the jump seat, but could not see the instruments on the forward panel.

At the captain's direction, the first officer landed the airplane on runway 27. The captain took control of the airplane on the rollout. He could see the fire trucks waiting and taxied the airplane to the fire fighters, stopping on the taxiway. The flight engineer said when the thrust reversers were deployed after landing, all Smoke Warning lights, Master Warning lights and lower Cargo Fire lights illuminated. He swiftly discharged the fire agent, as per the checklist. Egress After landing, the flight engineer opened the cockpit door and saw that the foyer area was full of smoke. He said cockpit visibility was good, until they opened the cockpit door after landing. Then the smoke poured in and "the visibility went down the toilet." The captain stopped the airplane and both he and the flight engineer called for an emergency evacuation. The captain did not read the Emergency Evacuation checklist, but he pulled all three fire handles and attempted to discharge the fire agents. The first officer shut off the engine start levers as the flight engineer turned off the battery switch. The flight engineer never felt he had time to do the Emergency Evacuation checklist. Olmsted, a 727 crewmember, told investigators that the "thick and choking smoke in the cockpit would have made it difficult to read the evacuation checklist."

The flight engineer went into the foyer area where the visibility was still good enough to see the L1 (left-front) door. He pulled the door emergency control lever on the LI door and heard a hissing noise, but the door did not open. The flight engineer pulled the lever harder, but the door still did not open. The visibility in the foyer was deteriorating, so the flight engineer walked cautiously to the R (right-front) door, which was not visible from the LI door, but was unable to open that door either. The captain estimated the foyer visibility at 3-5 feet.

The captain went back into the cockpit to open his window for egress. He unlatched his window and turned the window crank, feeling resistance. When he broke the air seal, the captain heard air escape with a hissing noise, then the cockpit visibility decreased almost to zero. Realizing the problem, the captain shouted, "We're still pressurized!"

When the flight engineer heard the captain shout, he ran back into the cockpit. Yelling, "Get back on oxygen!" he cranked the outflow valve open, depressurizing the airplane. The captain could not find his oxygen mask, which had dropped down to the floor.
After the flight engineer depressurized the airplane, the captain and first officer finally opened their windows. The captain saw the jumpseat riders wearing the only remaining oxygen masks, so he and the first officer stuck their heads outside to breathe. The captain described the smoke as gray to black, then turning black with a horrible acrid smell. He had to hold his breath until his window was opened. The smoke billowed out the window like a chimney.

After the first officer got his window opened, he saw the R1 slide deployed.

When the engineer heard the first officer say the door was opened, he grabbed his flashlight and entered the foyer area a second time. The visibility in the foyer area was bad with an acrid smelling smoke that did not smell like smoke from an electrical fire. The smoke was oily and sooty.

After shouting, "C'mon, c'mon, the ramps are out!" the flight engineer could hear voices in the foyer asking, "Where are you?" "I'm over here," he answered. "Follow the light." He aimed his flashlight toward the voices. The jumpseat riders came out of the smoke, went down the R1 slide, and the engineer followed them down. The first officer was sitting on the windowsill with his feet on his seat. He remained with the airplane until he was certain the jumpseat riders had evacuated. He had planned on evacuating via the door slides; but when he turned, he could not see the cockpit door. He then decided to evacuate through his cockpit window via the escape ropes and was met on the ground by the flight engineer and the jumpseat riders. According to Olmsted, smoke was now boiling out of the airplane, coming out of every opening.

The captain knelt on his seat with his upper body outside his window. The last time he came back into the cockpit, visibility was zero. He couldn't even see his hand in front of his face. He would also have to exit through the cockpit window.

Holding onto the escape rope, the captain came out of his window headfirst, righted himself, did one or two hand over hands and slid down the rope the rest of the way. He suffered rope burns to his hands during egress. The captain had his injured hands treated by rescue personnel. The flight engineer estimated that the evacuation took approximately 1 1/2 to 2 minutes.

The flight engineer briefed fire fighters on the location of HAZMAT containers and the location and operation of the Halon bottles connected to the HAZMAT containers. Fire fighters entered the airplane and manually opened the main cargo door to fight the fire.

Olmsted said the flame came out of the roof in front of the number 2 engine with black smoke and reddish-orange flame, like a blowtorch. When the flames vented through the cabin roof, the fire fighters got into their trucks and spayed the fire with foam. The fire eventually destroyed the airplane.

Investigators estimated the replacement cost of the airplane at $95 million and the lost cargo at $300 million. The National Transportation Safety Board never determined the source of the fire.

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Transcript of the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)

Legenda RDO = Radio transmission from accident aircraft
INT = Intercom
CAM = Cockpit Area Microphone sound or source
-1 = Voice identified as Captain
-2 = Voice identified as First Officer
-3 = Voice identified as Second Officer
NYAPP = New York TRACON
BCNTR = Boston air route traffic control center (ARTCC)
* = Unintelligible word
# = Expletive deleted
() = Questionable text
(()) = Editorial insertion
- = Pause

Notes: All times are expressed in eastern daylight savings time. Only radio transmissions involving the accident aircraft were transcribed.