January 2009 - US Airways 1549
US Airways Flight 1549 was a scheduled commercial passenger flight
from New York City to Charlotte, North Carolina that, on January 15,
2009, was successfully ditched in the Hudson River adjacent to midtown
Manhattan six minutes after takeoff from LaGuardia Airport after being
disabled by striking a flock of Canada Geese during its initial climb
The bird strike, which occurred just northeast of the George Washington
Bridge about three minutes into the flight, resulted in an immediate
and nearly complete loss of thrust from both engines. When the aircrew
of the Airbus 320 determined that they would be unable to safely reach
any airfield from the site of the bird strike, they turned it southbound
and glided over the Hudson, finally ditching the airliner near the USS
Intrepid museum about three minutes after losing power. All 155 occupants
safely evacuated the airliner, which was still virtually intact though
partially submerged and slowly sinking, and were quickly rescued by
The entire crew of Flight 1549 was later awarded the Master's Medal
of the Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators. The award citation read,
"This emergency ditching and evacuation, with the loss of no lives,
is a heroic and unique aviation achievement." It has been described
as "the most successful ditching in aviation history."
On January 15, 2009, the flight was cleared for takeoff from Runway
4 at LaGuardia at 3:24:56 p.m. EST (20:24:56 UTC). The crew made their
first report after becoming airborne at 3:25:51 as being at 700 feet
and climbing. There were 150 passengers and five crew members, including
the captain, first officer, and three flight attendants, on board.
The captain was Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger, 57, a former
fighter pilot who had been an airline pilot since leaving the Air Force
in 1980. He is also a safety expert and a glider pilot. The first officer
was Jeffrey B. Skiles, 49, who was on the last leg of his first assignment
in the Airbus A320 since passing the training course to fly the type.
The flight attendants were Donna Dent, Doreen Welsh, and Sheila Dail.
First Officer Skiles was at the controls of the flight when it took
off to the northeast from Runway 4 at 3:25 p.m., and was the first to
notice a formation of birds approaching the aircraft about two minutes
later, while passing through an altitude of about 3,200 feet (980 m)
on the initial climb out to 15,000 feet. The aircraft collided with
the birds at 3:27:01. The windscreen quickly turned dark brown and several
loud thuds were heard. Both engines ingested birds and immediately lost
almost all thrust. Capt. Sullenberger took the controls, while Skiles
began going through the three-page emergency procedures checklist in
an attempt to restart the engines.
At 3:27:36, using the call sign "Cactus 1539" , the flight
radioed air traffic controllers at New York Terminal Radar Approach
Control (TRACON)"Hit birds. We've lost thrust on both engines.
We're turning back towards LaGuardia." Passengers and cabin crew
later reported hearing "very loud bangs" in both engines and
seeing flaming exhaust, then silence from the engines and smelling the
odor of unburned fuel in the cabin. Responding to the captain's report
of a bird strike, controller Patrick Harten gave the flight a heading
to return to LaGuardia and told him that he could land to the southeast
on Runway 13. Sullenberger responded that he was unable.
Sullenberger asked if they could attempt an emergency landing in New
Jersey, mentioning Teterboro Airport in Bergen County as a possibility;
air traffic controllers quickly contacted Teterboro and gained permission
for a landing on runway 1. However, Sullenberger told controllers that
"We can't do it", and that "We're gonna be in the Hudson",
making clear his intention to bring the plane down on the Hudson River
due to a lack of altitude. Air traffic control at LaGuardia reported
seeing the aircraft pass less than 900 feet (270 m) above the George
Washington Bridge. About 90 seconds before touchdown, the captain announced,
"Brace for impact", and the flight attendants instructed the
passengers how to do so.
The plane ended its six-minute flight at 3:31 pm with an unpowered
ditching while heading south at about 150 miles per hour (130 kn; 240
km/h) in the middle of the North River section of the Hudson River roughly
abeam 50th Street (near the Intrepid Sea-Air-Space Museum) in Manhattan
and Port Imperial in Weehawken, New Jersey. Sullenberger said in an
interview on CBS television that his training prompted him to choose
a ditching location near operating boats so as to maximize the chance
of rescue. The location was near three boat terminals: two used by ferry
operator NY Waterway on either side of the Hudson River and a third
used by tour boat operator Circle Line Sightseeing Cruises. After coming
to a stop in the river, the plane began drifting southward with the
Immediately after the A320 had been ditched in mid-river, the aircrew
began evacuating the 150 passengers, both on to the wings through the
four mid-cabin emergency window exits and into an inflated slide deployed
from the front right passenger door (the front left slide failed to
operate as intended), while the partially submerged and slowly sinking
airliner drifted down the river with the current. Two flight attendants
were in the front, one in the rear. Each flight attendant in the front
opened a door, which was also armed to activate a slide, although the
port side slide did not immediately deploy. One rear door was opened
by a panicked passenger, causing the aircraft to fill more quickly with
water. The flight attendant in the rear who attempted to reseal the
rear door was not successful in doing so, she told CBS News. It was
later revealed that the impact with the water had ripped open a hole
in the underside of the airplane and twisted the fuselage, causing cargo
doors to pop open and filling the plane with water from the rear. The
flight attendant urged passengers to move forward by climbing over seats
to escape the rising water within the cabin. One passenger was in a
Having twice walked the length of the cabin to confirm that no one
remained inside after the plane had been evacuated, the captain was
the last person to leave the aircraft. Evacuees, some wearing life-vests,
waited for rescue on the partly submerged slides, knee-deep in icy river
water. Others stood on the wings or, fearing an explosion, swam away
from the plane. Air temperature at the time was about 20 °F (-7
°C), and the water was 36 °F (2 °C).
There were five serious injuries, one of which was a deep laceration
in flight attendant Doreen Welsh's leg. In total, 78 people were treated,
mostly for minor injuries and hypothermia.
||January 15, 2009
||15:30 Eastern Standard Time
||Airbus Industrie A320-214, reg. N106US
||US Airways, Flight 1549
Transcript of an Allied Signal/Honeywell model SSCVR cockpit voice
recorder (CVR / Black Box), s/n 2878, installed on an Airbus Industrie
A320-214, registration N106US.
ATIS Radio transmission from the Automated Terminal Information System
RDO Radio transmission from accident aircraft, US Airways 1549
CAM Cockpit area microphone voice or sound source
PA Voice or sound heard on the public address system channel
HOT Hot microphone voice or sound source1
INTR Interphone communication to or from ground crew
For RDO, CAM, PA, HOT and INTR comments:
-1 Voice identified as the Captain
-2 Voice identified as the First Officer
-3 Voice identified as cabin crewmember
-4 Voice identified as groundcrew
-? Voice unidentified
FWC Automated callout or sound from the Flight Warning Computer
TCAS Automated callout or sound from the Traffic Collision Avoidance
PWS Automated callout or sound from the Predictive Windshear System
GPWS Automated callout or sound from the Ground Proximity Warning System
EGPWS Automated callout or sound from the Enhanced Ground Proximity
RMP Radio transmission from ramp control at LaGuardia
GND Radio transmission from ground control at LaGuardia
CLC Radio transmission from clearance delivery at LaGuardia
TWR Radio transmission from the Air Traffic Control Tower at LaGuardia
DEP Radio transmission from LaGuardia departure control
4718 Radio transmission from another airplane (Eagle flight 4718)
CH CVR Channel identifier 1=Captain 2= First Officer 3= PA 4=
Cockpit Area Microphone
* Unintelligible word
@ Non-Pertinent word
& Third party personal name (see note 5 below)
-, - - - Break in continuity or interruption in comment
( ) Questionable insertion
[ ] Editorial insertion
15:00:32 [Start of Recording]
15:00:32 [Start of Transcript]
15:00:32 ATIS expressway visual runway three one approach in use. depart
runway four, bravo four hold line in use. LaGuardia class bravo services
available on frequency one two six point zero five. all pilots read
back all hold short instructions and assigned altitudes. advise on initial
contact you have information papa... LaGuardia airport information papa.
one nine five one zulu. winds
three four zero at one three, visibility one zero. ceiling three thousand
five hundred broken.
temperature minus six dewpoint minus one four. altimeter three zero
two three. remarks A O two
sea level pressure two three four. [ATIS repeats on ch2 until time 15:02:44.]
15:02:19 CAM-1 yes, thank you.
15:02:21 CAM-1 so we should have two open seats (cause) the jumpseaters
are gonna sit in the back.
15:02:25 CAM-? thank you.
15:02:26 CAM-1 all right anytime.
15:02:27 CAM-? cool you bet.
15:02:30 CAM-? ok.
15:02:35 HOT-2 the seats uh-
15:02:37 HOT-1 there you go.
15:02:45 CAM-? do you mind if I keep my bag(s) up here?
15:02:47 CAM-1 no not at all.
15:02:48 CAM-? thank you so much.
15:02:51 PA-1 a quick hello from the cockpit crew, this is fifteen forty
nine bound for Charlotte. its a nice day for flying, be at thirty eight
thousand feet mostly smooth about an hour and forty five minutes takeoff
to landing, welcome aboard.
15:03:12 CAM-2 quite a difference in the flight time pretty incredible,
huh? fifty six minutes.
15:03:15 HOT-1 well we had a hundred and sixty knots of wind all the
way up here. its a average headwind on this lists minus one ten.
15:03:34 HOT-1 all right.
15:03:34 PA-3 if everyone would please take their seats.
15:03:39 HOT-1 * *.
15:03:40 INTR-4 hello cockpit ground's ready.
15:03:42 INTR-1 we'll give them a call.
15:03:42 RDO-2 (ground) fifteen forty nine like to push at uh gate twenty
15:03:47 RMP Cactus (fifteen) forty nine....gate twenty one, spot twenty
eight, ground * for your taxi.
15:03:55 RDO-2 ok uh. that's uh * what's wrong here. [may be multiple
15:03:57 HOT-1 ok... clear to push?
15:04:00 HOT-2 yeah.
15:04:01 INTR-4 yes sir, you say you are clear to push?
15:04:02 INTR-1 clear to push, spot twenty eight, brakes released.
15:04:03 RDO-2 and that's uh spot twenty eight for Cactus uh nine- er
fifteen forty nine, excuse me and over to ground twenty one seven.
15:04:05 INTR-4 twenty eight, brakes released.
15:04:09 RMP affirmative.
15:04:09 CAM-? seated and stowed.
15:04:11 HOT-1 thank you, all set.
15:04:13 CAM [sound similar to cockpit door closing]
15:04:20 HOT-1 ok. that # door again.
15:04:23 HOT-2 what's wrong?
15:04:24 HOT-1 this-
15:04:25 HOT-2 oh.
15:04:25 CAM-1 (you) have to slam it pretty hard.
15:04:29 CAM [sound similar to cockpit door closing]
15:04:52 HOT-1 got the newest Charlotte.
15:05:04 PA-3 ladies and gentlemen all electronic devices have to be
turned off at this time, anything with an on off button must be in the
15:05:07 HOT-1 yeah too bad they aren't still using three one... for
15:05:10 HOT-2 yeah.
15:05:11 HOT-1 I was hoping we could land on four and takeoff on three
one, but it didn't quite work out that way.
15:05:22 HOT-2 well we can make an attempt to beat Northwest here anyways.
15:05:25 HOT-1 what's that?
15:05:26 HOT-2 so we can make an attempt to beat Northwest but he's
already starting isn't he.
15:05:29 HOT-1 yeah. and we have to pull up before we can even start
15:05:32 HOT-2 they start their number two engine first.
15:05:34 PA-3 good afternoon ladies and gentlemen welcome on board US
Airways flight fifteen forty nine, with service to Charlotte. please
take a moment to listen to this important safety information, in preparation
for departure be certain that your seat back is straight up and your
tray table is stowed. all carryon items must be secured completely underneath
the seat in front of you, or stowed in an overhead compartment. please
use caution when placing items in or removing
them from the overhead bins. please ensure that all electronic devices
are turned off, some
devices such as cell phones, TVs, radios and any device transmitting
a signal may not be
used at anytime during flight. however you may be certain * * use other
electronic devices when
advised by your crew. please direct your attention to the flight attendants
in the cabin, for everyone's safety regulations require your compliance
with all lighted signs, placards, and crewmember instructions. whenever
the seatbelt sign is illuminated please make sure that you seatbelt
is fastened low and tight around your hips. to fasten insert the metal
fitting into the buckle
and tighten by pulling loose end away from you. to release lift the
metal flap. during the flight the
Captain may turn off the fasten seatbelt sign, however for safety we
recommend that you
keep your seatbelt fastened at all times. please review the safety instruction
card in the seatback
pocket in front of you, it explains the safety features of this aircraft
as well as the location and operation of the exit and flotation devices.
your seat cushion serves as a flotation device, to remove your cushion,
(pla)- take it with you to the nearest usable exit, when exiting the-[sound
similar to power interruption 15:07:01] place both arms through the
straps and hug it to your
chest. flight attendants are pointing out there are a total of eight
exits on this aircraft, two door exits
in front of the aircraft, four window exits over the wings, and two
door exits in the rear of the
aircraft. once again, two door exits at the front of the aircraft, four
window exits over the wings,
and two door exits in the rear of the aircraft. each door is equipped
with an evacuation slide
if directed to exit... the aircraft jump onto the slide and move away
from the aircraft. take a
moment to locate the exit nearest you keeping in mind that the closest
usable exit may be located
behind you. if there is a loss of electrical power low level lighting
will guide you to the exits
indicated by illuminated exit signs. if needed oxygen masks will be
released from the overhead,
to start the flow of oxygen, reach up and pull the mask toward you,
fully extending the plastic tubing. place the mask over your nose and
mouth, place the elastic band over your head. to tighten pull the tab
on each side of the mask. the plastic bag does not inflate when oxygen
is flowing. secure your mask before assisting others. as a reminder
smoking is prohibited in all areas of the aircraft including the lavatories.
federal regulations prohibit tampering with disabling or destroying
a lavatory smoke detector. on behalf of your entire crew, its our pleasure
to have you on board.... thank you for flying US Airways.
15:05:34 HOT-1 that's interesting.
15:05:41 HOT-2 did you always start number one or is that a uh America
15:05:44 HOT-1 no that's no its been that way ever since I've been on
it, for six and a half years anyway.
15:06:09 INTR-1 confirm we're clear to start?
15:06:10 INTR-4 uh, one second.
15:06:13 HOT-1 he told me to wait.
15:06:15 HOT-2 he did?
15:06:16 HOT-1 yeah, this guy was giving the signal but I asked and
he said no wait just a second.
15:06:17 HOT-2 yeah.... OK.
15:06:25 INTR-4 kay. clear to start.
15:06:26 INTR-1 clear to start.
15:06:26 HOT-1 start engines.
15:06:44 HOT-2 wonder how the Northwest and Delta pilots are gettin
15:06:47 HOT-1 I wonder about that too, I have no idea.
15:07:01 CAM [sound similar to power interruption]
15:07:01 CAM [sound similar to increase in engine noise/frequency]
15:07:04 HOT-1 yeah hopefully better than we and West do.
15:07:11 HOT-2 be hard to do worse.
15:07:13 HOT-1 yeah... well I hadn't heard much about it lately but
I can't imagine it'd be any better.
15:07:20 HOT-2 I think that's just cause we're separate..... and there's
nothing going on right now.
15:07:25 HOT-1 right.
15:07:28 INTR-4 kay set the parking brake.
15:07:32 INTR-1 parking brake set. disconnect.
15:07:34 INTR-4 brake set, disconnect.
15:08:15 HOT-1 okay wands up, wave off.
15:08:16 HOT-2 wands up.
15:08:17 HOT-1 flaps two, taxi.
15:08:36 RDO-2 ground Cactus uh fifteen forty nine spot twenty eight,
15:08:40 GND Cactus fifteen forty nine LaGuardia ground runway four
uh, turn left alpha, short of golf, and uh did you call clearance?
15:08:48 RDO-2 (I'm) sorry forgot.
15:08:48 HOT-1 *.
15:08:52 HOT-1 uh thirty five two. so its alpha short of golf is that
15:08:56 HOT-2 yup.
15:08:57 HOT-1 yeah I'll start taxiing while you do that.
15:08:58 HOT-2 ok.
15:09:35 RDO-2 Cactus fifteen forty nine is uh over BIGGY seven one
three four, and three sixty and up to five thousand.
15:09:44 HOT-1 you put it here.
15:09:46 HOT-2 what was that?... am I on the wrong one?
15:09:53 HOT-1 you switched me off of ground.
15:09:55 HOT-2 oh, sorry.
15:09:57 HOT-? * you wanna be there [heard on CH2]
15:10:04 HOT-1 you were talking on number two but you switched number
15:10:07 HOT-2 ok.
15:10:11 RDO-2 I'm sorry I messed up my radio here Cactus fifteen forty
nine, seven one three four and we're three sixty up to five thousand.
15:10:40 RDO-2 Cactus-
15:10:41 RDO-2 Cactus fifteen forty nine is uh squawking seven one three
four and were uh runway four three sixty and five thousand.
15:10:48 CLC (kay it's) fifteen forty nine LaGuardia clearance read
*back correct, ground point seven verify information papa.
15:10:53 RDO-2 we have papa.
15:10:54 RDO-2 we have papa thank you Cactus uh * fifteen forty nine.
15:10:58 CLC ground point seven.
15:11:05 HOT-2 ok.
15:11:06 HOT-1 ok no change.
15:11:08 HOT-2 I don't think my uh MIC switch works all the time here.
15:11:12 HOT-1 your trigger, your trigger?
15:11:12 CAM-2 * * transmit.
15:11:14 CAM-2 what's that?
15:11:15 HOT-1 your trigger on the stick? ... I'll write that up too.
15:11:18 CAM-2 so you don't hear me transmit... you might wanna jump
15:11:21 HOT-1 ok.... got it.
15:11:25 RDO-1 and OPS, fifteen forty nine.
15:11:28 HOT-1 I'm calling on number two.
15:11:31 OPS yeah, (sixteen) forty nine go ahead.
15:11:33 RDO-1 yeah fifteen forty nine if you want uh weight and balance
uh corrected to total of passenger one forty eight and ACM [additional
crew members] two.
15:11:42 OPS ok one forty eight.
15:11:51 RDO-1 yeah for fifteen forty nine passenger count is one four
eight, plus ACM two.
15:12:00 RDO-1 so one forty eight, plus two ACM's.
15:12:02 OPS ok. copy that.
15:12:08 HOT-1 all right... I'm still holding short of golf, and they're
correcting the passenger count to one forty eight.
15:12:25 GND Cactus fifteen forty nine taxi foxtrot, bravo hold short
echo, just gotta hold you there for about three minutes uh for your
uh in trail into Charlotte.
15:12:31 RDO-2 foxtrot, bravo, short of echo, Cactus fifteen forty nine.
15:12:35 HOT-1 ok, foxtrot, bravo, hold short of echo... and once we
stop then, I'll do the flight control check.
15:12:57 HOT-1 did it uh, did it not uplink?
15:13:01 HOT-2 (well) I figured it was the old one.
15:13:04 HOT-1 what's that?
15:13:06 HOT-2 umm.... ok.
15:13:18 HOT-2 so do you want me to use this one?
15:13:19 HOT-1 oh... oh I see what you're saying, yeah I uh you can
wait if you want I just thought we'd have something in there.
15:13:37 HOT-1 yeah we can wait, that's fine.
15:13:38 HOT-2 go with this one? ok.
15:13:40 HOT-1 cause we're going to be holding here for a minute anyway....
all right foxtrot, bravo, hold short of echo.
15:14:15 HOT-1 where is the uh, the portion of the release the- of the
weight and balance part of it that was below what you tore off to put
on here... or was there part of it.
15:14:24 HOT-2 there was, I think I threw it away it just had names
on it... its right here.
15:14:26 HOT-1 ok thank you. I need this number, yeah I wanted this
part... I'm gonna just call this guy directly cause I don't think this
OPS guy knows what the # he's doin.
15:15:04 HOT-1 I'm just gonna call our load control agent directly,
it's his number right here.
15:15:12 FWC [sound of single chime]
15:15:15 HOT-1 yeah I'm the Captain on fifteen forty nine aircraft one
zero six if you'll if you will please correct the passenger count we
have a total of one four eight, plus two plus two ACM. [sounds as if
this communication is by cellular telephone]
15:15:19 GND Cactus fifteen forty nine follow the Northwest you can
15:15:23 RDO-2 Cactus fifteen forty nine follow Northwest monitor tower,
15:15:32 HOT-1 that's it... thank you. runway four, thank you, bye.
[sounds as if communication is by cellular telephone]
15:15:38 HOT-1 what did I miss?
15:15:40 HOT-2 follow Northwest.
15:15:41 HOT-1 all right here we go.
15:15:49 HOT-1 * I talked to CLP [Central Load Plan] he's gonna send
15:15:54 HOT-1 all right, flight control check.
15:15:57 CAM-2 full up........full down.
15:16:01 HOT-2 neutral.
15:16:03 HOT-2 full left.
15:16:06 HOT-2 full right.
15:16:07 HOT-2 neutral.
15:16:09 HOT-2 full left.
15:16:11 HOT-2 full right.
15:16:13 HOT-2 neutral.
15:17:26 HOT-1 I'll go ahead and sit them down.
15:17:30 PA-1 flight attendants please be seated for takeoff.
15:17:33 HOT-2 kay.
15:18:03 HOT-1 okay, taxi check.
15:18:07 HOT-2 * *.
15:18:19 HOT-2 departure briefing, FMS. [Flight Management System]
15:18:21 HOT-1 reviewed runway four.
15:18:22 HOT-2 flaps verify. two planned, two indicated.
15:18:24 HOT-1 two planned, two indicated.
15:18:46 HOT-2 um. takeoff data verify... one forty, one forty five,
one forty nine, TOGA. [Takeoff/Go Around]
15:18:53 HOT-1 one forty, one forty five, one forty nine, TOGA.
15:18:56 HOT-2 the uh weight verify, one fifty two point two.
15:19:00 HOT-1 one fifty two point two.
15:19:02 HOT-2 flight controls verify checked.
15:19:03 HOT-1 check.
15:19:04 HOT-2 stab and trim verify, thirty one point one percent...
15:19:08 HOT-1 thirty one point one percent, zero.
15:19:11 HOT-2 the uh.... engine anti-ice.
15:19:13 HOT-1 is off.
15:19:16 CAM-2 ECAM [Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring] verify
takeoff, no blue, status checked.
15:19:19 HOT-1 takeoff, no blue, status checked.
15:19:22 PA-2 ladies and gentlemen at this time we're number one for
takeoff, flight attendants please be seated.
15:19:25 HOT-1 * *.
15:19:27 HOT-2 takeoff min fuel quantity verify. nineteen thousand pounds
required we got twenty one point eight on board.
15:19:32 HOT-1 nineteen thousand pounds required, twenty one eight on
15:19:35 HOT-2 flight attendants notified, engine mode is normal, the
taxi checklist is complete sir.
15:19:40 HOT-1 below the line... oh you finished it all * * -
15:19:42 CAM-2 yeah.
15:19:42 HOT-1 -yeah kay thank you. we're good. holding short.
15:20:03 HOT-1 still possible.
15:20:06 CAM-2 oh yeah.
15:20:37 TWR Cactus fifteen forty nine, LaGuardia runway four position
and hold. traffic to land three one.
15:20:40 RDO-2 position and hold runway four, Cactus uh fifteen forty
15:20:42 HOT-1 on the hold.
15:20:44 CAM [sound similar to increase then decrease in engine noise/frequency]
15:21:27 HOT-1 your brakes, your aircraft.
15:21:30 HOT-2 my aircraft.
15:21:48 HOT-1 he's gotta *.
15:24:54 TWR Cactus fifteen forty nine runway four clear for takeoff.
15:24:56.7 RDO-1 Cactus fifteen forty nine clear for takeoff.
15:25:06 CAM [sound similar to increase in engine noise/speed]
15:25:09 CAM-2 TOGA.
15:25:10 HOT-1 TOGA set.
15:25:20 HOT-1 eighty.
15:25:21 HOT-2 checked.
15:25:33 HOT-1 V one, rotate.
15:25:38 HOT-1 positive rate.
15:25:39 HOT-2 gear up please.
15:25:39 HOT-1 gear up.
15:25:45 TWR Cactus fifteen forty nine contact New York departure, good
15:25:48 RDO-1 good day.
15:25:49 HOT-2 heading select please.
15:25:51.2 RDO-1 Cactus fifteen forty nine, seven hundred, climbing
15:26:00 DEP Cactus fifteen forty nine New York departure radar contact,
climb and maintain one five thousand.
15:26:02 CAM [sound similar to decrease in engine noise/speed]
15:26:03.9 RDO-1 maintain one five thousand Cactus fifteen forty nine.
15:26:07 HOT-1 fifteen.
15:26:08 HOT-2 fifteen. climb.
15:26:10 HOT-1 climb set.
15:26:16 HOT-2 and flaps one please.
15:26:17 HOT-1 flaps one.
15:26:37 HOT-1 uh what a view of the Hudson today.
15:26:42 HOT-2 yeah.
15:26:52 HOT-2 flaps up please, after takeoff checklist.
15:26:54 HOT-1 flaps up.
15:27:07 HOT-1 after takeoff checklist complete.
15:27:10.4 HOT-1 birds.
15:27:11 HOT-2 whoa.
15:27:11.4 CAM [sound of thump/thud(s) followed by shuddering sound]
15:27:12 HOT-2 oh #.
15:27:13 HOT-1 oh yeah.
15:27:13 CAM [sound similar to decrease in engine noise/frequency begins]
15:27:14 HOT-2 uh oh.
15:27:15 HOT-1 we got one rol- both of 'em rolling back.
15:27:18 CAM [rumbling sound begins and continues until approximately
15:27:18.5 HOT-1 ignition, start.
15:27:21.3 HOT-1 I'm starting the APU.
15:27:22.4 FWC [sound of single chime]
15:27:23.2 HOT-1 my aircraft.
15:27:24 HOT-2 your aircraft.
15:27:24.4 FWC [sound of single chime]
15:27:25 CAM [sound similar to electrical noise from engine igniters
15:27:26.5 FWC priority left. [auto callout from the FWC. this occurs
when the sidestick priority button is activated on the Captain's sidestick]
15:27:26.5 FWC [sound of single chime]
15:27:28 CAM [sound similar to electrical noise from engine igniters
15:27:28 HOT-1 get the QRH... [Quick Reference Handbook] loss of thrust
on both engines.
15:27:30 FWC [sound of single chime begins and repeats at approximately
5.7 second intervals until 15:27:59]
15:27:32.9 RDO-1 mayday mayday mayday. uh this is uh Cactus fifteen
thirty nine hit birds, we've lost thrust (in/on) both engines we're
turning back towards LaGuardia.
15:27:42 DEP ok uh, you need to return to LaGuardia? turn left heading
of uh two two zero.
15:27:43 CAM [sound similar to electrical noise from engine igniters
15:27:44 FWC [sound of single chime, between the single chimes at 5.7
15:27:46 RDO-1 two two zero.
15:27:50 HOT-2 if fuel remaining, engine mode selector, ignition.* ignition.
15:27:54 HOT-1 ignition.
15:27:55 HOT-2 thrust levers confirm idle.
15:27:58 HOT-1 idle.
15:28:02 HOT-2 airspeed optimum relight. three hundred knots. we don't
15:28:03 FWC [sound of single chime]
15:28:05 HOT-1 we don't.
15:28:05 DEP Cactus fifteen twenty nine, if we can get it for you do
you want to try to land runway one three?
15:28:05 CAM-2 if three nineteen-
15:28:10.6 RDO-1 we're unable. we may end up in the Hudson.
15:28:14 HOT-2 emergency electrical power... emergency generator not
15:28:18 CAM [sound similar to electrical noise from engine igniters
15:28:19 HOT-1 (it's/is) online.
15:28:21 HOT-2 ATC notify. squawk seventy seven hundred.
15:28:25 HOT-1 yeah. the left one's coming back up a little bit.
15:28:30 HOT-2 distress message, transmit. we did.
15:28:31 DEP arright Cactus fifteen forty nine its gonna be left traffic
for runway three one.
15:28:35 RDO-1 unable.
15:28:36 TCAS traffic traffic.
15:28:36 DEP okay, what do you need to land?
15:28:37 HOT-2 (he wants us) to come in and land on one three...for
15:28:45 PWS go around. windshear ahead.
15:28:45 HOT-2 FAC [Flight Augmentation Computer] one off, then on.
15:28:46 DEP Cactus fifteen (twenty) nine runway four's available if
you wanna make left traffic to runway four.
15:28:49.9 RDO-1 I'm not sure we can make any runway. uh what's over
to our right anything in New Jersey maybe Teterboro?
15:28:55 DEP ok yeah, off your right side is Teterboro airport.
15:28:59 TCAS monitor vertical speed.
15:29:00 HOT-2 no relight after thirty seconds, engine master one and
15:29:02 DEP you wanna try and go to Teterboro?
15:29:03 RDO-1 yes.
15:29:05 TCAS clear of conflict.
15:29:07 HOT-2 -off.
15:29:07 HOT-1 off.
15:29:10 HOT-2 wait thirty seconds.
15:29:11 PA-1 this is the Captain brace for impact.
15:29:14.9 GPWS one thousand.
15:29:16 HOT-2 engine master two, back on.
15:29:18 HOT-1 back on.
15:29:19 HOT-2 on.
15:29:21 DEP Cactus fifteen twenty nine turn right two eight zero, you
can land runway one at Teterboro.
15:29:21 CAM-2 is that all the power you got? * (wanna) number one?
or we got power on number one.
15:29:25 RDO-1 we can't do it.
15:29:26 HOT-1 go ahead, try number one.
15:29:27 DEP kay which runway would you like at Teterboro?
15:29:27 FWC [sound of continuous repetitive chime for 9.6 seconds ]
15:29:28 RDO-1 we're gonna be in the Hudson.
15:29:33 DEP I'm sorry say again Cactus?
15:29:36 HOT-2 I put it back on.
15:29:37 FWC [sound of continuous repetitive chime for 37.4 seconds
15:29:37 HOT-1 ok put it back on... put it back on.
15:29:37 GPWS too low. terrain.
15:29:41 GPWS too low. terrain.
15:29:43 GPWS too low. terrain.
15:29:44 HOT-2 no relight.
15:29:45.4 HOT-1 ok lets go put the flaps out, put the flaps out.
15:29:45 EGPWS caution. terrain.
15:29:48 EGPWS caution terrain.
15:29:48 HOT-2 flaps out?
15:29:49 EGPWS terrain terrain. pull up. pull up.
15:29:51 DEP Cactus uh....
15:29:53 DEP Cactus fifteen forty nine radar contact is lost you also
got Newark airport off your two o'clock in about seven miles.
15:29:55 EGPWS pull up. pull up. pull up. pull up. pull up. pull up.
15:30:01 HOT-2 got flaps out.
15:30:03 HOT-2 two hundred fifty feet in the air.
15:30:04 GPWS too low. terrain.
15:30:06 GPWS too low. gear.
15:30:06 CAM-2 hundred and seventy knots.
15:30:09 CAM-2 got no power on either one? try the other one.
15:30:09 4718 two one zero uh forty seven eighteen. I think he said
he's goin in the Hudson.
15:30:11 HOT-1 try the other one.
15:30:13 EGPWS caution terrain.
15:30:14 DEP Cactus fifteen twenty nine uh, you still on?
15:30:15 FWC [sound of continuous repetitive chime begins and continues
to end of recording]
15:30:15 EGPWS caution terrain.
15:30:16 HOT-2 hundred and fifty knots.
15:30:17 HOT-2 got flaps two, you want more?
15:30:19 HOT-1 no lets stay at two.
15:30:21 HOT-1 got any ideas?
15:30:22 DEP Cactus fifteen twenty nine if you can uh....you got uh
runway uh two nine available at Newark it'll be two o'clock and seven
15:30:23 EGPWS caution terrain.
15:30:23 CAM-2 actually not.
15:30:24 EGPWS terrain terrain. pull up. pull up. ["pull up"
repeats until the end of the recording]
15:30:38 HOT-1 we're gonna brace.
15:30:38 HOT-2 * * switch?
15:30:40 HOT-1 yes.
15:30:41.1 GPWS (fifty or thirty)
15:30:42 FWC retard.
15:30:43.7 [End of Recording]
15:30:43.7 [End of Transcript]